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Abstract
Mergers have the potential for negative social welfare consequences
from increased likelihood or eectiveness of future collusion. This raises
the question of whether there are meaningful thresholds for the post-
merger industry that should trigger significant scrutiny by the Department
of Justice or Federal Trade Commission. This paper provides empirical
analysis relevant to this question. The data does not come from an indus-
try in which there were mergers, but instead from an industry in which
explicit collusion was admittedly rampant in the 1990’s, the Vitamins
Industry. Dierent vitamin products are produced by dierent numbers
of firms, and for dierent vitamin products, dierent numbers of firms
were involved in the conspiracy. In analyzing post-plea pricing, we find
that duopolies continue as if the explicit conspiracy never stopped, while
products with three or four cartel firms return to pre-conspiracy pricing,
or lower, quite quickly. Although it is di!cult to extrapolate to other
industries, the evidence suggests that, by itself, a proposed reduction in
the number of firms manufacturing a given product from four to three via
a merger is not problematic in terms of conduct following explicit collu-
sion. The danger of a three firm industry is that it is close to duopoly,
and the collusive benefits of duopoly appear to be sustainable well past
intervention by enforcement authorities.
	We thank Brian McClelland and Scott Lobel for valuable research assistance, and we thank
seminar participants at the Federal Communications Commission for helpful comments. This paper
was completed while Marx was visiting the FCC. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of
the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the FCC or any other member of its sta.
1 Introduction
Amajor social welfare concern regarding a potential merger is the impact of increased
concentration on the future suppression of interfirm rivalry within the industry. The
Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade
Commission (FTC)1 implicitly mandate an analysis of the increased chances of future
coordination as well as the increased payos from any incremental coordination among
firms in an industry:
Arguments regarding the change in coordinated eects from a merger have histor-
ically consisted of four components. First, if there are a substantial number of firms
remaining after the merger, then adverse eects are viewed as relatively unlikely.
Second, if the Herfindahl index rises by more than 100 points from the merger, then
the merger is viewed as being worthy of further investigation for adverse social eects
through coordinated eects. Third, the Guidelines make special note of “Maverick”
firms–if a Maverick is part of a merger, then the merger is viewed as having poten-
tially adverse social eects, but if a Maverick exists in the industry and is not involved
with the merger, then the merger is viewed with less concern. Fourth, arguments are
made, rooted in the Folk Theorem and economics literature on tacit collusion, about
the change from pre-merger to post-merger in the possibility of interfirm monitoring
and punishment for deviant behavior.
According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (at Section 2.1):
A merger may diminish competition by enabling the firms selling in the
relevant market more likely, more successfully, or more completely to en-
gage in coordinated interaction that harms consumers. Coordinated in-
teraction is comprised of actions by a group of firms that are profitable
for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the
others. This behavior includes tacit or express collusion, and may or may
not be lawful in and of itself.
In light of this, a natural research program involves empirical studies of indus-
tries in which mergers were approved. Do prices in these industries reflect increased
interfirm coordination? And if there are periods of increased coordination, is this
increased coordination short-lived? Specifically, are periods of increased coordination
1Available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html.
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followed by a return to pre-merger prices, or do prices remain elevated above pre-
merger levels? There are few studies of this nature due to data availability,2 as well
as potential hesitations about making cross-industry comparisons.
Such studies would inform social policy and provide significant guidance for en-
forcement agencies regarding the allocation of their scarce resources. Specifically, if
the answers to the questions suggested above vary according to the number of firms
in the post-merger industry, then one might find a threshold value for the number of
post-merger firms such that a merger than reduces the number of post-merger firms
below the threshold can be expected to have significant negative welfare implications
from subsequent coordinated eects.
The early literature in industrial organization discusses how, in industries with
small numbers of firms, firms might be expected to recognize their mutual interdepen-
dence and that one might expect relatively more collusive outcomes in industries with
relatively fewer firms (see Chamberlin, 1933; Bain, 1951; and Stigler, 1964). Later
work provides experimental and theoretical support for the idea that the competitive-
ness of an industry with a small number of firm can be expected to be increasing in
the number of firms.3 Selten’s (1973) paper argues that “four are few, six are many,”
so that six firms are su!ciently many that collusive outcomes are unlikely. The em-
pirical work of Kwoka (1979) leads him to conclude that “three-firm coordination
problems are so severe as to make a large third firm more likely a rival.” Thus, his re-
sults suggest that in many cases three firms are su!ciently many to prevent collusive
outcomes. The empirical work of Bresnahan & Reiss (1991) lead them to conclude
that once there are three to five firms in an industry, a new entrant has little eect on
the competitiveness of the industry, suggesting that three to five firms are su!cient
to prevent collusive outcomes. Recent experimental work by Huck, Normann, and
Oechssler (2004) suggests competitiveness is monotonic in the number of firms and
that four or five firms is su!cient to prevent collusive outcomes.
Since the mid-1990s, the DOJ and the FTC ordinarily sued to block horizontal
mergers that would have reduced the number of market participants to three or fewer
2Enforcement agencies should mandate, as a condition of merger approval, that certain infor-
mation be made available to them post-merger on an ongoing basis, and they should devote sta
resources to the analysis of this data.
3Dolbear, et al. (1968) provide experimental results, and Selten (1973) provides theoretical
results. Also, Werden and Baumann (1986) provide theoretical results in which competitiveness
is nonmonotonic in the number of firms. In their model, damages increase more slowly than the
benefits of collusion as the number of firms increases.
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firms. As a rough generalization, over the past decade, antitrust lawyers confidently
have been able to advise the parties to proposed mergers that, based on an exam-
ination of the agencies’ decisions to prosecute, the threshold at which the federal
authorities would sue to block deals is four-to-three.4 As Table 1 below indicates,
this litigation threshold has shifted significantly over the past half-century.
Table 1
DOJ/FTC Merger Policy: Litigation Threshold for Horizontal Mergers 1960-2005
Decade Threshold of Likely Litigation Challenge
1960s Merger reduces number of survivors to 12 or fewer firms
1970s Merger reduces number of survivors to 8 or fewer firms
1980s Merger reduces number of survivors to 5 or fewer firms
1990s Merger reduces number of survivors to 3 or fewer firms
2000s Merger reduces number of survivors to 3 or fewer firms
These adjustments have been the result of two interrelated developments: DOJ
and FTC self-assessments driven by changes in the state of research and scholarly
commentary, and judicial decisions that retreated from the strong presumptions of
illegality adopted by courts in the 1960s and imposed more demanding burdens upon
the federal agencies when seeking to block horizontal mergers.5
The existing economics literature suggests that if five similar-sized firms will re-
main post-merger, then the merger should not be viewed as problematic from a coor-
dinated eects standpoint. The existing literature does not clearly address whether
a merger that reduces the number of firms from five to four or from four to three
should be viewed as problematic. Thus, empirical studies that can address these
4There have been exceptions to this general proposition. FTC’s complaint in its unsuccessful
challenge in 2004 to the acquisition by Arch Coal of Triton alleged that the number of firms in one
relevant market following the merger would have fallen from five to four. Federal Trade Commission
v. Arch Coal Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004). It is also possible to identify some horizontal
transactions (particularly in the aerospace and defense sectors) over the past decade for which the
federal antitrust agencies took no action even though the number of surviving firms fell to less than
three. Kovacic (2003, 444-47).
On the promulgation and revision of merger guidelines by the federal agencies since the 1960, see
Greene (2005); Symposium (2003). On the influence of judicial decisions and the change in merger
jurisprudence since 1960, see Gavil et al. (2002, 418-558); Leary (2002).
5On the promulgation and revision of merger guidelines by the federal agencies since the 1960,
see Greene (2005); Symposium (2003). On the influence of judicial decisions and the change in
merger jurisprudence since 1960, see Gavil et al. (2002, 418—558); Leary (2002).
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number could provide a useful guide for enforcement agencies’ as to where to invest
scarce resources in challenging mergers on the basis of coordinated eects.
In this paper, we analyze price data for thirty-one vitamin products for which
we have observations that span three period of time: prior to a period of admitted
explicit collusion, during a period of admitted explicit collusion, and after a period of
admitted explicit collusion. The period of admitted explicit collusion spans much of
the 1990’s, when many of the manufacturers of vitamins admitted their guilt regarding
participation in a worldwide price-fixing conspiracy.6
There are many dierent vitamins, and an even greater number of vitamin prod-
ucts. The number and identities of firms that can produce each vitamin product
dier across the products, as did the number of cartel participants. Yet, there is not
significant heterogeneity in the factor inputs used to produce dierent vitamin prod-
ucts, and demand fluctuations tend to aect vitamin products in similar ways. Thus,
we are able to attribute much of the dierence in pricing behavior to the number of
firms producing the dierent vitamin products.
We analyze the price path for these vitamin products after the end of the plea-
period. This allows us to examine whether, after a period of explicit collusion, firms
can maintain prices at cartel levels, or whether there is erosion in prices relative to
their explicitly collusive levels. We examine whether the price paths following the plea
periods for the dierent vitamin products depend on the number of firms engaged in
the previous explicit collusion, controlling of the magnitude of the fringe producers.
This analysis allows us to obtain a partial understanding of how market concentration
impacts the e!cacy of tacit collusion.
Our primary finding is that duopolies continue as if the explicit conspiracy never
stopped while products with three or four cartel firms return to pre-conspiracy pricing,
or lower, quite quickly.
2 Coordinated Eects Analysis
Concern about postmerger coordinated eects has supplied the main conceptual basis
for antitrust scrutiny of horizontal transactions since the Celler-Kefauver Amendment
6Explicit collusion may have existed prior to the beginning of the period of admitted guilt. In
fact, recent work (Marshall, Marx, and Rai, 2005) suggests that the collusion may have started in
the mid-80’s.
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to the Clayton Act’s merger control provision in 1950.7 The views of scholars, enforce-
ment agencies, and courts about the appropriate application of coordinated eects
analysis have undergone considerable change over the past half-century. Through the
1960s, merger doctrine and enforcement policy reflected acute apprehension about
the oligopoly gap — the zone in which firms in moderately or highly concentrated
industries could realize supranormal returns by accounting for their interdependence
in ways that did not transgress the Sherman Act’s prohibitions on express collusion
and abusive single-firm behavior.8
In the 1950s and 1960s, many economists and lawyers endorsed measures to ad-
dress the oligopoly gap directly by deconcentrating industries with oligopoly market
structures.9 Although many observers regarded deconcentration was the preferred
solution, merger policy had a key role to play in ensuring that horizontal combina-
tions did not create new oligopolies or increase the eectiveness of tacit coordination
in already concentrated industries. As suggested above, U.S. merger policy in the
1960s and early 1970s aggressively policed horizontal mergers, and Supreme Court
decisions establishing powerful (and typically decisive) presumptions of illegality for
transactions that resulted in post-acquisition market shares of less than ten percent.10
The reliance of merger doctrine and enforcement policy upon structural presump-
tions fell under heavy scholarly attack. Much of the criticism raised doubts about
how eectively oligopolists could coordinate their behavior by tacit means–that is,
without resorting to an overt or covert exchange of assurances.11 From at least the
7The 1950 amendments established the basic substantive framework of today’s merger control
regime. See Gellhorn et al. (2004, 418—21) (describing rationale for and history of the 1950 amend-
ments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act).
8For a representative synthesis of this view, see Kaysen and Turner (1959, 110) (observing that
“[t]he principal defect of present antitrust law is its inability to cope with market power created by
jointly acting oligopolists). See also Kovacic & Shapiro (2000, 51—52).
9See Kovacic (1989, 1136—39) (recounting proposals by economists and lawyers to deconcentrate
oligopoly sectors). Congress declined to enact the deconcentration legislation, and eorts by the
federal antitrust agencies to use the existing antitrust laws to restructure oligopolies — for example,
through the prosecution of “shared monopoly” cases by the FTC — were entirely unsuccessful. See
Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 269 (1982) (dismissing shared monopolization complaint against leading
U.S. producers of breakfast cereal); Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453, 461 (1981) (dismissing shared
monopolization complaint against leading refiners of petroleum products).
10See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (prohibiting merger that
yielded a post-acquisition market share of 4.49 percent).
11See Baker (1993) (describing evolution of economic thinking about oligopoly and the feasibility
and frequency of eective coordination). An important stimulus for this line of inquiry was George
Stigler’s work (1964) on the di!culties that firms face in achieving eective coordination when they
seek to orchestrate their behavior through express, rather than tacit, means.
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late 1970s to the present, this perspective has influenced courts and enforcement agen-
cies in two basic ways. First, it has dramatically shifted the structural threshold of
concern in horizontal merger cases. Decisions of the courts have weakened the power
of the structural presumption in coordinated eects cases except at the highest levels
of concentration.12 Second, as reflected in judicial decisions such as Arch Coal in the
United States and AirTours in the European Union, the enforcement agencies have
been pressed in coordinated eects cases to explain more fully and convincingly how
coordination among the surviving firms will take place in the post-merger period.13
In light of these developments, a major challenge for enforcement agencies in fu-
ture coordinated eects cases is to improve the basis for predicting the competitive
consequences of individual cases and, in litigated disputes, to provide a more con-
fident basis for courts to infer that specific consolidations will have anticompetitive
eects. One means to this end is for the enforcement community to take steps to
strengthen the empirical foundations of merger analysis. In recent years the U.S.
agencies have invested additional resources in “competition policy research and de-
velopment” (Kovacic 2005). These investments have included ex post assessments of
the competitive eects of completed mergers (Muris & Pitofsky 2005, 827-28) and
the review of past merger reviews to identify evidence that most strongly influenced
the decision whether to challenge transactions (FTC 2004).
A promising additional frontier for empirically-oriented research relevant coordi-
nated eects analysis is for competition agencies to study their experience with the
enforcement of antitrust laws against cartels.14 Government competition authori-
ties have accumulated considerable experience in anti-cartel enforcement programs,
and the examination of individual enforcement episodes can yield valuable insights
about industry conditions in which tacit coordination is most likely to be eective.
The examination of the Vitamins Cartel in the sections that follow illuminate the
possibilities of such a research program.
12See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (condemning acquisition that
reduced the number of firms in the relevant market from three to two); see also Baker (2004)
(discussing application of structural presumption in Heinz case).
13See FTC v. Arch Coal Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004); AirTours plc v. Commission,
Case T-342/99, [2002]ECR II-2585.
14Some of these possibilities are suggested in Kolasky (2002).
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3 Data from the Vitamins Industry
3.1 Overview
Vitamins are produced and purchased for both human and animal consumption. Each
vitamin has a specific set of beneficial eects. When considering the cost of producing
animal feed or human food, the incremental cost of the vitamin additives typically is
small. Due to the significant nutritional impact of vitamin supplements, the demand
for vitamins is highly inelastic.
Although it is common to think of vitamins as a single entity–such as Vitamin
A or Vitamin E–in fact, specific vitamin products are manufactured within each
vitamin type. For example, in this section, we consider four dierent Vitamin A
products: A Acetate 500 USP, A Palmitate 250 USP, A Palmitate 500 USP, and A
Acetate 650 Feed.
Vitamins are largely produced through processes of chemical synthesis, although
there have been recent advances in fermentation technologies for the production of
some vitamins. The industry is highly concentrated, and the large capital invest-
ments, and especially the production experience, required for the manufacture of
vitamins are a barrier to entry. Although the major producers have similar produc-
tion technologies, the chemical synthesis processes involve substantial “learning by
doing.” Each producer becomes better, through time, at debottlenecking the chemical
synthesis process at any given plant. A given vitamin product made by one firm is
chemically identical to the same product made by another firm.
In the late 1990s, the DOJ obtained guilty pleas from several major vitamin
manufacturers for participating in an international price fixing cartel that extended
back to at least January 1990. In addition, the European Community and Canada
found that several of the vitamin producers had violated antitrust laws within their
jurisdictions. In this report, we refer to the interval of the DOJ plea dates as the
“plea period.”
Detailed descriptions of the vitamins conspiracy can be found in the European
Commission’s (2003) decision. In general, the cartel fixed the market shares of the
colluding firms, referring to these shares as “budget targets,” and monitored the
output of the cartel members. The cartel used interfirm output transactions as a
mechanism for rectifying any internal issues that arose, whether these were adherence
to budgeted market share allocations or other matters regarding the enhancement of
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cartel profits. For example, “Any company that sold more than its allotted share was
required in the following year to purchase the excess from another conspirator that
had not reached its volume allocation target.”
The cartels in the dierent vitamin products operated over approximately the
same period of time in the 1990s, and possibly prior to 1990. The dierent vitamins
have similar factor inputs and demand for the dierent vitamins in subject to similar
shocks, although on the demand side, there may be some dierences between vitamins
intended for human use and those intended for use in animals. Because of this, we
analyze human and feed vitamins separately. Among human vitamins and among
feed grade vitamins, similarities in the environments in which the cartels operated,
including the time periods and the supply and demand factors, allow us to make
comparisons across vitamins.
3.2 Data
Price data on a set of vitamin products is available from the Expert Report of B.
Douglas Bernheim, M.D.L. No. 1285, In Re: Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, Misc. No.
99-0197 (TFH), May 24, 2002. Section 12 of Bernheim (2002) provides data for 37
vitamin products, including the monthly weighted average unit price in dollars per
kilogram from 1980 to 2002 (shorter time period for some vitamin products), the dates
of the plea-period, the identities of the cartel firms, and the identities or locations
(e.g., Eastern Europe) of non-cartel firms. In addition, Section 10 of Bernheim (2002)
provides data for 2 additional vitamin products, Ascorbic Acid 100% USP and E 50%
Adsorbate Feed Grade. For these two vitamin products, prices are broken out by
producer, so we used the worldwide production shares for Vitamins C and E, given
in Figures 8-7 and 8-1 of Bernheim (2002), to construct a weighted average price.15
As an example of the data that is available for each vitamin product in the Bern-
heim (2002) report, Figure 1 shows the data available for Vitamin A Acetate 650 Feed
Grade. The information includes a weighted average price for the vitamin product,
the plea-era sales value, and a list of the manufacturers, both cartel and non-cartel.
15Weights are given by year and are not available after 1998, so for years after 1998, the weights
are assumed to be the same as in 1998. Figure 8-7 does not explicitly state BASF’s Vitamin C
production share four years. Based on the figure, we judge those shares to be 1980: 2%; 1981: 2%;
1989: 4%; and 1996: 4%.
8
Figure 1: Example of price data available from Bernheim (2002).
According to Bernheim (2002), the price data are derived from the Roche ROVIS
database (except Choline Chloride (B4), which we do not include in our data), and
the vitamin products in Section 12 are those that satisfy two requirements: the data
must be consistently reported throughout the 1980 to 2001 time period (with a few
exceptions) and the product must account for at least 1.5 percent of Roche’s U.S.
sales within the relevant vitamin family between 1980 and 2001 and account for at
least $10 million in Roche sales volume over the same period.
To improve comparability across vitamin products, we focus on vitamin products
that are produced by Roche. This eliminates six vitamin products, including two
Choline Chloride products, three Niacin products, and Vitamin B12 Crystals. In
addition, we drop the two Biotin products because they are outliers in a number
of ways: they are the only two vitamin products with five firms in the cartel (the
other Roche vitamins have four or fewer in the cartel); they are small in terms of the
dollar amount of sales during the plea period (they have less than $9 million in plea
sales, whereas the average plea sales of the other Roche vitamins is over $97 million);
and the identities of the cartel firms, although Roche is one, are not consistent with
those of the other Roche vitamin products (the Biotin products are the only Roche
products that are also produced by Tanabe and Lonza). That leaves us with the
thirty-one vitamin products shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Vitamin Type Vitamin Product
Start of 
Plea Period
End of Plea 
Period
Number 
in Cartel
Non-Cartel 
Production 
Share at End 
of Plea
1 A Vitamin A Acetate 500 USP 1/1/1990 2/1/1999 2 9
2 A Vitamin A Acetate 650 Feed 1/1/1990 2/1/1999 3 9
3 A Vitamin A Palmitate 250 USP 1/1/1990 2/1/1999 2 9
4 A Vitamin A Palmitate 500 USP 1/1/1990 2/1/1999 2 9
5 B1 Thiamine (B1) Hydrochloride USP 1/1/1991 6/1/1994 3 40
6 B1 Thiamine (B1) Mononitrate USP 1/1/1991 6/1/1994 3 40
7 B2 Riboflavin (B2) 33 1/3% USP 1/1/1991 9/1/1995 1 6
8 B2 Riboflavin (B2) 80%/50% Spray-Dried Feed Grade 1/1/1991 9/1/1995 3 6
9 B2 Riboflavin (B2) USP 1/1/1991 9/1/1995 3 6
10 B5 Calpan (B5) SD Feed Grade 1/1/1991 12/1/1998 3 17
11 B5 Calpan (B5) USP 1/1/1991 12/1/1998 3 17
12 B6 Pyridoxine (B6) Hydrochloride USP 1/1/1991 6/1/1994 3 46
13 Beta Carotene Beta Carotene 10% Cold Water Soluble USP 1/1/1991 12/1/1998 2 0
14 Beta Carotene Beta Carotene 22% HSS USP 1/1/1991 12/1/1998 2 0
15 Beta Carotene Beta Carotene 30% Fluid Soluble USP 1/1/1991 12/1/1998 2 0
16 C Ascorbic Acid 100% 1/1/1991 11/1/1995 4 38
17 C Ascorbic Acid Coated Feed 1/1/1991 11/1/1995 4 38
18 C Ascorbic Acid Coated USP 1/1/1991 11/1/1995 4 38
19 C Ascorbic Acid Compressible 90% USP 1/1/1991 11/1/1995 3 38
20 C Sodium Ascorbate USP 1/1/1991 11/1/1995 4 38
21 Carotenoids Apocarotenal 20% USP 5/1/1993 12/1/1998 2 0
22 Carotenoids Canthaxanthin 10% Feed Grade 5/1/1993 12/1/1998 2 0
23 Carotenoids Canthaxanthin 10% USP 5/1/1993 12/1/1998 2 0
24 D Vitamin D 3 100 Human 1/1/1994 6/1/1998 3 0
25 D Vitamin D 3 500 Feed 1/1/1994 6/1/1998 3 0
26 E Vitamin E 50% Adsorbate Feed Grade 1/1/1990 2/1/1999 4 13
27 E Vitamin E Acetate 50% Spray Dried Feed 1/1/1990 2/1/1999 3 13
28 E Vitamin E Acetate 50% Spray-dried USP 1/1/1990 2/1/1999 2 13
29 E Vitamin E Acetate Oil USP 1/1/1990 2/1/1999 3 13
30 Folic Acid Folic Acid (B9) 1/1/1991 6/1/1994 4 41
31 Niacin Niacinamide (B3) 33 1/3% USP 1/1/1992 3/1/1998 1 9
To define the plea period for each vitamin product, we use the U.S. plea period for
that product’s vitamin type if there is one, and otherwise we use the EC or Canadian
plea period as given in Bernheim (2002, Table 6). For vitamin products with both
EC and Canadian plea periods, but no U.S. plea period, we use the EC plea period.
Note that Table 2 shows two vitamin products that have only one firm in the
“cartel.” For these vitamin products, Roche is the only manufacturer charged with
illegal activity. The data for these two vitamin products give us some idea of how a
monopolist manufacturer would behave. One can view the price increase during the
plea period for those products as related to the increase in the prices of substitute
products rather than due to conspiratorial behavior among the manufacturers of those
products.
Although the plea periods vary for the dierent vitamin products, data are avail-
able for all the vitamin products in our sample for 48 months prior to the beginning
of their plea periods and for 28 months after the end of their plea periods. Thus, for
each vitamin product, for a given number of months before the beginning of the plea
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period or after the end of the plea period, we can calculate the percentage change in
price relative to the maximum price achieved during the plea period.
Figures 2 and 3 show for feed and human vitamin products, respectively, on the
horizontal axis the number of months prior to the start of the plea period (nega-
tive numbers) and the number of months after the end of the plea period (positive
numbers), and on the vertical axis the percentage change in price relative to the
maximum price achieved during the plea period. Note that we are not claiming that
the behavior in the Vitamins Industry prior to the plea period was non-collusive; to
the contrary, the analysis of the vitamin manufacturers’ public price announcements
by Marshall, Marx, and Rai (2005) suggests that the period of collusion extended
back to January of 1985. We address this more formally in Section 4.3.
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Ascorbic Acid Coated Feed
Calpan (B5) SD Feed Grade
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Vitamin A Acetate 650 Feed
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Figure 2: Percentage change in price relative to the plea-period maximum for feed
grade vitamin products. Negative dates indicate months prior to the beginning of
the plea period. Positive dates indicate months after the end of the plea period.
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Apocarotenal 20% USP
Ascorbic Acid 100%
Ascorbic Acid Coated USP
Ascorbic Acid Compressible 90% USP
Beta Carotene 10% Cold Water Soluble USP
Beta Carotene 22% HSS USP
Beta Carotene 30% Fluid Soluble USP
Calpan (B5) USP
Canthaxanthin 10% USP
Folic Acid (B9)
Niacinamide (B3) 33 1/3% USP
Pyridoxine (B6) Hydrochloride USP
Riboflavin (B2) 33 1/3% USP
Riboflavin (B2) USP
Sodium Ascorbate USP
Thiamine (B1) Hydrochloride USP
Thiamine (B1) Mononitrate USP
Vitamin A Acetate 500 USP
Vitamin A Palmitate 250 USP
Vitamin A Palmitate 500 USP
Vitamin D 3 100 Human
Vitamin E Acetate 50% Spray-dried USP
Vitamin E Acetate Oil USP
Figure 3: Percentage change relative to the plea-period maximum for human vitamin
products. Negative dates indicate months prior to the beginning of the plea period.
Positive dates indicate months after the end of the plea period.
The data are not useful for examining the propensity of firms to form an explicit
cartel since we only have the data because there were explicit cartels in all products.
However, the data are potentially good for examining the propensity of firms who
were explicitly colluding to continue in something close to that manner after the plea
period. This has implications for merger policy. If prices remain high after the plea
period, there is a reasonable chance that the firms may have discovered the advantages
of tacit collusion without explicit collusion. And, if there are dierences in post-plea
prices based on the number of firms in the cartel, this may indicate dierences in the
ability of firms to sustain tacit collusion depending on the number of firms involved.
In what follows, we contrast the data for vitamin products in which only one
producer was charged with illegal activity with vitamin products in which there were
two-firm cartels, three-firm cartels, and four-firm cartels and ask whether there are
dierences in post-plea pricing that would suggest a merger that reduces the num-
ber of producers to a particular number of firms should be a concern as far as the
competitiveness of the industry is concerned.
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4 Analysis
4.1 Graphical Analysis
We now consider the percentage change in price relative to the plea-period maximum
for the dierent vitamin products broken out by the number of firms in the cartel.
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Figure 4: Percentage change in price relative to plea-period maximum by product.
We see that for vitamin products with only one firm in the cartel, especially
Riboflavin, prices remained high after the plea period relative to their pre-plea levels.
For all but one of the vitamins products with a two-firm cartel, prices remain close
to their plea-period maxima. The price of Vitamin E Acetate 50% SD USP falls
after the end of the plea period, but after more than two years, remains well above
its pre-plea levels. For the cartels involving three firms, the evidence is somewhat
mixed.16 Prices for some products remain above their pre-plea levels, but others drop
sharply after the end of the plea period. For four-firm cartels, in all cases, the price
16Bernheim (2002) states, “In the case of Riboflavin (B2), the evidence suggests that Roche
attempted to re-cartelize the market with Rhone-Poulenc after the end of the conspiracy period. This
may have prolonged the eects of the original conspiracy and delayed the onset of non-conspiratorial
price dynamics.
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eventually ends up below pre-plea nominal levels (for Ascorbic Acid Coated Feed, the
price does not drop below pre-plea levels until mid 1999, 41 months after the end
of the plea period). The rate of descent varies for these vitamin products, with the
prices in coated Vitamin C products descending less rapidly than for many of the
other vitamin products.
We now combine the graphs described above, averaging across vitamin products,
to obtain the average price changes relative to the plea-period maximum for vitamin
products with dierent numbers of cartel members.
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Figure 5: Average percentage change in price relative to the plea-period maxima by
number in cartel. Negative dates indicate months prior to the beginning of the plea
period. Positive dates indicate months after the end of the plea period.
Figure 5 shows a dramatic dierence between the prices of one and two-firm cartels
versus larger cartels in the post-plea period. When there is only one primary producer
or there is a two-firm cartel, firms are able to maintain prices significantly above pre-
plea levels. This is despite the fact that for most vitamin products in our sample,
there are competing non-cartel producers. The prices for three and four-firm cartels
remain elevated above their pre-plea levels for approximately one year after the end
of the plea period.
Relative to pre-plea levels, for two, three, and four-firm cartels, the plea-period
maximum price is approximately 30% higher; however, for one-firm cartels, the plea-
period maximum price is only 18% higher than the pre-plea price. This may be
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because for one-firm cartels, the pre-plea price is already close to the monopoly level,
and any increase in price may be more a result of the increase in the price of substitute
products rather than conspiratorial behavior in that vitamin product.
To provide three additional ways to view the data, we also consider the percentage
price change relative to the price in January of 1985, relative to one month prior to
the beginning of the plea period, and relative to the final month of the plea period.
Note that we only have data for all vitamin products for 28 months after the end of
the plea period, but beyond 28 months after the end of the plea period, some vitamin
products drop out of our data.
We begin with price changes relative to the month prior to the beginning of the
plea period.
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Figure 6: Average percentage change in price relative to one month prior to the
beginning of the plea period by number in the cartel. The price change shown at
date zero is the for maximum price during the plea period. Positive dates indicate
months after the end of the plea period.
Figure 6 shows that price for two, three, and four-firm cartels increase between
49% and 59% during the plea period relative to one month prior to the plea period.
For one-firm cartel, the price only increases about 22%. As mentioned above, this
may be because for vitamin products with only one major producer, the pre-plea
prices were already close to their monopoly levels. For one and two-firm cartels,
prices remain well above their pre-plea levels. For one-firm cartels, prices remain
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close to their plea-period maxima long after the end of the plea period and show no
signs of decay. For two-firm cartels there is slight decay, but prices remain more than
20% above their pre-plea levels over three years after the end of the plea period. For
three and four-firm cartels, prices fall to their pre-plea levels within ten months for
four-firm cartels and within fourteen months for three-firm cartels. It is interesting
that prices for three and four-firm cartels fall to about 40% below their pre-plea levels
in the five months after the end of the plea period. This may be due to competition
from new entrants whose entry was induced by the high prices during the plea period.
Figure 7 provides similar information, but uses the price on January 1, 1985 as
the reference point.17 We include this graph because the analysis of Marshall, Marx,
and Rai (2005) suggests that the collusive period in the Vitamins Industry extended
back to 1985. In fact, the general upward trend in prices show in Figure 7 between
month c60 and month zero, and the fact that prices fall below their 1985 levels after
the end of the plea period for three and four-firm cartels, provide additional support
for this.
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Figure 7: Average percentage change in price relative to the price in January of 1985
by number in the cartel. The price change shown at date zero is the for maximum
price during the plea period. Negative dates in dicate months prior to the beginning
of the plea period, and positive dates indicate months after the end of the plea period.
Month c60 corresponds to January 1985 for most vitamin products.
17The sample used for Figure 7 does not include Ascorbic Acid 100% or Vitamin E 50% Adsorbate
Feed Grade because the data for these two vitamins does not extend back to January of 1985.
16
Figure 8 provides a slightly dierent perspective from Figures 6 and 7. Instead
of using a date prior to the plea period as a benchmark, it uses the last month of
the plea period as the benchmark. Thus, Figure 8 provides information about the
sustainability of cartel prices after the end of explicit collusion.
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Figure 8: Average percentage change in price relative to the last month of the plea
period by number in the cartel. Date zero is the last month of the plea period, and
positive dates indicate months after the end of the plea period.
Figure 8 shows that prices for one and two-firm cartels remain steady from the end
of the plea period out as far as our data allows. In contrast, the prices for three and
four-firm cartels decrease rapidly after the end of the plea period, with the prices of
vitamin products with four-firm cartels falling somewhat faster than those of vitamin
products with three-firm cartels. Note that some of the jumps in the data shown in
Figure 8 for three and four-firm cartels occur because certain vitamin products drop
out of the data at dierent numbers of months after the end of the plea period.
4.2 Review of a Simple Model
In this section we remind readers of a simple model based on Cournot competition
and linear demand. This model provides some insights that can be used to understand
what appear to be dierences in the viability of tacit collusion based on the number
of firms in the industry.
Assume there are n firms producing a homogenous product with common constant
marginal cost c. Assume industry inverse demand is P = a c bQ, where a > c z 0
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and b > 0. Assuming either Cournot competition or fully collusive behavior, we can
calculate the profits for the firms in our model.
Table 3
Cournot All-inclusive All-inclusive Profit if other nc 1 collude
profit cartel profit cartel profit/firm In cartel Outside cartel
n (ac)
2
b(n+1)2
(ac)2
4b
(ac)2
4bn
(ac)2
(n1)9b
(ac)2
9b
n = 1 (ac)
2
4b
(ac)2
4b
(ac)2
4b
— —
n = 2 (ac)
2
9b
(ac)2
4b
(ac)2
8b
— —
n = 3 (ac)
2
16b
(ac)2
4b
(ac)2
12b
(ac)2
18b
(ac)2
9b
n = 4 (ac)
2
25b
(ac)2
4b
(ac)2
16b
(ac)2
27b
(ac)2
9b
Note that when there are two firms in an industry, each firm can increase its profit
by colluding. If a firm chooses not to collude, the industry necessarily reverts to non-
cooperative play with two firms. However, when there are three firms in an industry,
if two firms agree to collude, then the third firm strictly prefers to remain outside the
cartel (and play non-cooperatively against the two-firm cartel) rather than join the
two firms to form a three-firm cartel. This is apparent from Table 3, which shows that
the profit from creating a three-firm cartel is (ac)
2
12b
, but the profit from remaining
outside while a two-firm cartel operates is (ac)
2
9b
.
In order to get a sense for the order of magnitudes of these dierences, Table
4 calculates the percentage change in a firm’s profit from joining an all-inclusive
cartel versus non-cooperative play, and the percentage change in a firm’s profit from
remaining outside the cartel when the other nc 1 collude versus joining and creating
an all-inclusive cartel.
Table 4
% in profit from joining
an all-inclusive cartel
versus non-cooperative play
% in profit from remaining
outside versus joining
when other nc 1 collude
n (n+1)
24n
4n
4n9
9
n = 2 1
8
= 12.5% —
n = 3 1
3
= 33.3% 1
3
= 33.3%
n = 4 9
16
= 56.3% 7
9
= 77.8%
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Table 4 shows that when there are three firms in an industry, the benefit to
staying outside the cartel when the other two firms collude is the same magnitude
as the benefit of all-inclusive collusion versus non-cooperative play. When there are
four firms in the industry, there is an even larger benefit to staying outside the cartel
when the other three firms collude.
More formally, this analysis shows that in our model an all-inclusive cartel is not
in the core of the coalition formation game when there are three or more firms.18
When there are three or more firms, given any division of the cartel profits, there will
be some firm that can profitably deviate by leaving the cartel. All-inclusive collusion
is in the core when there are only two firms.
This model emphasizes that having more than two firms in an industry can be
extremely disruptive to firms’ attempts to collude. Furthermore, even if there is some
collusion when there are more than two firms, the deadweight loss associated with
collusion is greatly reduced if there is a large non-cartel presence in the market.
4.3 Regression Analysis
Although the price plots in Figures 4—8 suggest that there may be dierences in post-
plea pricing based on the number of firms in the cartel, in this section we control
for other factors that may explain the dierences, such as the size of the non-cartel
fringe and the end-use of the vitamin product. We present results for OLS regressions
using as the dependent variable the percentage change in price over dierent periods
of time. In regressions 1—4, we use the percentage change in price 12 and 24 months
after the end of the plea period relative to the price one month prior to the beginning
of the plea period. In regressions 5—8, we use the percentage change in price 12 and
24 months after the end of the plea period relative to the price in January of 1985.
In regressions 9—12, we use the percentage change in price 12 and 24 months after the
end of the plea period relative to the price during the last month of the plea period.
Thus, regressions 1—4 can be related to Figure 6, regressions 5—8 can be related to
Figure 7, and regressions 9—12 can be related to Figure 8.
As independent variables, we use a dummy that is one if the vitamin product
is a feed vitamin, a dummy that is one if the non-cartel production share (at the
vitamin level) in the last year of the plea is greater than or equal to 5% and less than
18This assumes that when one firm exits an n-firm cartel, the remaining n c 1 firms continue to
collude.
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10%, and a dummy that is one if the non-cartel production share (at the vitamin
level) in the last year of the plea is greater than or equal to 10%.19 The dummies
for the non-cartel production share provide some measure of the outside competition
faced by the cartel and potentially also the ease of entry for that vitamin. Finally,
we include dummies for whether the cartel for the vitamin product was a two-firm,
three-firm, or four-firm cartel, with the one-firm cartel being the omitted category.
For each dependent variable we run two regressions, one with dummies for two, three
and four-firm cartels and one that drops the dummy for the two-firm cartel. We do
this because there are only two products for which there is a monopoly producer.
Table 5 below gives descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent vari-
ables used in our regressions.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Count
% change from 
-1 at +12 0.133 0.067 0.277 -0.589 0.508 1.076 -0.317 0.758 31
% change from 
-1 at +24 0.047 0.015 0.289 -0.599 0.492 1.132 -0.403 0.729 31
% change from 
1/1985 at +12 0.502 0.499 0.365 -0.982 0.042 1.225 -0.087 1.138 29
% change from 
1/1985 at +24 0.394 0.441 0.379 -1.055 -0.054 1.345 -0.243 1.102 29
% change from 
last in plea at 
+12
-0.140 -0.097 0.156 -0.141 -0.887 0.566 -0.532 0.035 31
% change from 
last in plea at 
+24
-0.203 -0.193 0.184 -1.128 -0.405 0.614 -0.574 0.040 31
Feed 0.258 0 0.445 -0.697 1.163 1 0 1 31
non-cartel 
share [5-10) 0.258 0 0.445 -0.697 1.163 1 0 1 31
non-cartel 
share >=10 0.484 0 0.508 -2.138 0.068 1 0 1 31
2-firm cartel 0.323 0 0.475 -1.462 0.798 1 0 1 31
3-firm cartel 0.419 0 0.502 -2.017 0.344 1 0 1 31
4-firm cartel 0.194 0 0.402 0.702 1.631 1 0 1 31
In regressions 1—8, we focus on price changes relative to dates prior to the begin-
ning of the plea period. The dependent variables used in these regressions provide
measures of the lasting impact of explicit collusion on prices.
19Non-cartel production shares are available in Bernheim (2002), but only on an annual basis at
the vitamin level (not the vitamin product level).
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Table 6: Regressions 1—8
Regression Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Variable
constant -0.0409 0.3023 0.0261 0.2918 0.2859 0.7121 0.3748 0.7100
0.1396 0.1103 0.1440 0.1031 0.1319 0.1045 0.1430 0.0966
feed -0.0741 -0.0630 -0.0787 -0.0701 0.1408 0.1564 0.0934 0.1057
0.1001 0.0976 0.1010 0.0975 0.1683 0.1598 0.1665 0.1578
non-cartel share [5,10) 0.1552 0.0578 0.1017 0.0263 0.0485 -0.0724 -0.0247 -0.1198
0.0986 0.1166 0.0978 0.1100 0.1113 0.1333 0.1196 0.1271
non-cartel share >=10 0.0455 0.0086 -0.0444 -0.0729 -0.2500 -0.2953 -0.3416 -0.3772
0.1236 0.1310 0.1095 0.1128 0.1667 0.1598 0.1720 0.1606
2-firm cartel 0.3605 0.2792 0.4480 0.3523
0.1150 0.1203 0.1025 0.1206
3-firm cartel 0.0426 -0.2596 -0.0780 -0.3121 0.2583 -0.1181 0.0896 -0.2064
0.1357 0.1090 0.1463 0.0963 0.1437 0.1244 0.1521 0.1252
4-firm cartel -0.0154 -0.3252 -0.1066 -0.3466 0.0771 -0.3077 -0.0374 -0.3400
0.1627 0.1380 0.1713 0.1239 0.2047 0.1713 0.2218 0.1858
Number of obs. 31 31 31 31 29 29 29 29
R squared 0.404 0.327 0.531 0.489 0.439 0.365 0.541 0.499
t-statistic 2-firm=3-firm 3.26 4.06 1.48 1.95
t-statistic 3-firm=4-firm 0.55 0.31 1.05 0.46
Robust standard errors are in italics. Coefficients that are significant at the 5% level are in bold.
%change in price at 
+12 relative to first 
month before plea
%change in price at 
+24 relative to first 
month before plea
%change in price at 
+12 relative to 1/1985
%change in price at 
+24 relative to 1/1985
Focusing on regressions 1—4, we see statistically significant coe!cients for a two-
firm cartel’s price increase and for the price decreases of three and four-firm cartels.
The coe!cient for a two-firm cartel is significantly dierent from that for a three-
firm cartel, but the coe!cients for three and four-firm cartels are not significantly
dierent from one another. The results for regressions 5—8 again show a positive
significant coe!cient on the two-firm dummy. The coe!cients on the cartel dummies
are generally larger in regressions 5—8 than in regressions 1—4, which may reflect
collusive behavior prior to the beginning of the plea period as suggested by the results
of Marshall, Marx, and Rai (2005).
In the second set of regressions, we focus on price changes relative to the last month
of the plea period. This dependent variable allows us to focus on the sustainability
of the collusive price increase.
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Table 7: Regressions 9—12
Regression Number 9 10 11 12
Dependent Variable
constant 0.0308 0.0215 0.0790 0.0157
0.0593 0.0234 0.0558 0.0242
feed -0.0895 -0.0898 -0.0879 -0.0900
0.0646 0.0635 0.0626 0.0618
non-cartel share [5,10) -0.0365 -0.0339 -0.0737 -0.0558
0.0497 0.0415 0.0485 0.0414
non-cartel share >=10 -0.2031 -0.2021 -0.2500 -0.2432
0.0482 0.0485 0.0446 0.0468
2-firm cartel -0.0098 -0.0665
0.0475 0.0455
3-firm cartel -0.0591 -0.0509 -0.1634 -0.1077
0.0776 0.0491 0.0739 0.0480
4-firm cartel -0.0623 -0.0539 -0.1535 -0.0963
0.0888 0.0682 0.0865 0.0674
Number of obs. 31 31 31 31
R squared 0.626 0.626 0.752 0.746
t-statistic 2-firm=3-firm 1.05 2.14
t-statistic 3-firm=4-firm 0.05 -0.17
Robust standard errors are in italics. Coefficients that are 
significant at the 5% level are in bold.
% change in price at 
+12 relative to last 
month of plea
% change in price at 
+24 relative to last 
month of plea
Focusing on regressions 9—12, we see that having a non-cartel production share
greater than 10% results in a statistically significant decrease in the price during the
twelve months after the end of the plea period. In regressions 11—12, the coe!cient for
the three-firm cartel is negative and statistically significant. Also in these regressions,
the coe!cients on two-firm and three-firm cartels are significantly dierent, but the
coe!cients for three and four-firm cartels are not significantly dierent from one
another.
Considering the regressions of Tables 6 and 7 together, the feed dummy appears to
be of no consequence. We expect the dummy for the non-cartel production share to
capture both entry and competitive eects in regressions 1—8. The high price during
the explicitly collusive period would be expected to induce entry, possibly causing the
post-plea price to fall below its pre-plea levels (the entry eect), and a larger non-
cartel share would be expected to increase the rate at which the price declines after
the end of explicit collusion (the competition eect). In regressions 9—12, we expect
these dummies to capture only competitive eects because in these regressions the
percentage change is not measured relative to pre-plea levels. The regression results
suggest that the competitive eects are more important.
The large positive and statistically significant coe!cients on the two-firm cartel
dummies in the regressions in Table 6 imply that a two-firm cartel achieves a larger
increase in price during the plea-period than when there is a monopoly producer. One
might interpret this as occurring because products in which there was a monopoly
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producer were already priced at monopoly levels. The two-firm cartel dummies are
not significant in the regressions of Table 7 because prices are equally persistent
relative to a monopoly.
The three and four-firm cartel dummies in regressions 1—4 suggest that prices
for three and four-firm cartels are approximately 30% lower than for a one or two
firm cartel, relative to their pre-plea levels. One reason that the three and four-firm
dummies are not always significant is that there is a positive correlation between the
non-cartel share and the number of firms in the cartel. Finally, note that we see
significant coe!cients on the three-firm cartel dummy in regressions 11 and 12, but
not in regressions 9 and 10, which reflects the continuing erosion in price following
the end of the plea period.
4.4 Role of a Maverick Firm
As suggested by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the presence of certain firms,
labeled “mavericks,” in an industry may reduce the ability of the other firms to
maintain prices above their competitive levels. In the Vitamins Industry, twelve
firms paid a total of $911 million in fines related to U.S. antitrust charges; however,
Rhone-Poulenc, who was a producer of a Vitamin A and E products, received amnesty
and did not pay any U.S. fines.20
20Roche, BASF, Takeda, Eisai, Daiichi, and Merck, which were major manufacturers of the vita-
min products in our data, all paid substantial U.S. fines. Besides Rhone-Poulenc, the only cartel
firms for vitamin products in our data that did not pay U.S. fines were Solvay (Vitamin D), Kongo
(Folic Acid), and Sumika/Sumitomo (Folic Acid).
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Figure 9: Average percentage change in price relative to the last month of the plea
period by participation by Rhone-Poulenc (0 indicates Rhone-Poulenc did not pro-
duce the vitamin product and 1 indicates that it did). Date zero is the last month of
the plea period, and positive dates indicate months after the end of the plea period.
The conditions of amnesty might have induced behavior by Rhone-Poulenc so that
it acted like a maverick firm in this industry during the post-plea period. To analyze
this conjecture, we run two additional regressions. We consider how the presence of
Rhone-Poulenc aects the percentage change in price one year and two years after
the end of the plea period, relative to the last month of the plea period.
Table 8
Regression number 13 14
Dependent Variable % change in price at +24 
relative to last month of plea
% change in price at +12 
relative to last month of plea
constant -0.0146 0.0394
0.0383 0.0423
feed 0.0331 0.0191
0.0322 0.0429
non-cartel share [5,10) 0.0089 -0.0341
0.0194 0.0315
non-cartel share [10,100] -0.1615 -0.2136
0.0363 0.0401
2-firm cartel 0.0056 -0.0531
0.0358 0.0361
3-firm cartel -0.0461 -0.1521
0.0424 0.0499
4-firm cartel -0.0443 -0.1378
0.0586 0.0665
Rhone-Poulenc -0.3303 -0.2884
0.0405 0.0577
Number of obs. 31 31
R squared 0.892 0.897
Robust standard errors are in italics. Coefficients that are significant at the 5% level are in bold
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As shown in Table 8, the coe!cient on the Rhone-Poulenc dummy is negative
and highly statistically significant. In addition, it is large in magnitude, dwarfing
all other eects in the first regression. The point estimates in the second regression
show that having a non-cartel production share of greater than 10% results in a 21%
decrease in the price in the first two years after the end of the plea period, but the
presence of Rhone-Poulenc results in a 29% decrease in price over the same period,
all else constant.
So, the post-plea behavior of Rhone-Poulenc, which is reasonably conjectured to
be induced by the conditions of amnesty, provides a window by analogy to the impact
of maverick firm on pricing behavior in an industry.
5 Conclusion
As we mentioned in the introduction, there are papers in the economics literature that
attempt to answer the question of how many is enough for competition. Returning to
this question, our data show that, at least for the Vitamins Industry, two is clearly not
enough for competition. As for three or four, it is not clear from our data whether
having three or four firms in a market is su!cient to guarantee the competitive
outcome, but our data do suggest having three or four firms results in a significantly
more competitive outcome than having only two firms in the market.
Although it is di!cult to extrapolate to other industries, the evidence from the
Vitamins Industry suggests that a proposed reduction in the number of firms man-
ufacturing a given product from four to three via a merger does not alone pose an
incremental threat in terms of tacit coordination. But, this should not be interpreted
as blanket approval for mergers in which industry size goes from four to three. The
vitamins product data suggests that the real social danger after a period of explicit
collusion is duopoly, and three is much closer to two than four. Coordinated eects
analysis would be required of any merger to assess whether the merger will lead the
industry toward eective duopoly through tacit (or explicit) collusion.
Beyond its specific technical findings, our examination of the Vitamins Cartel
suggests the value of retrospective inquiries as guides to the refinement and applica-
tion of coordinated eects analysis to the review of mergers. Amid continuing debate
about how competition authorities should conduct a coordinated eects analysis and
about whether the treatment of coordinated eects in the U.S. merger guidelines
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requires adjustment, there appears to be broad agreement about the value of using
retrospective studies to supplement a careful fact-intensive assessment of proposed
transactions and the institutional arrangements that govern the operations of the
merging parties (FTC/DOJ Joint Workshop 2004, 127—195). Merger policy will be
well served if enforcement authorities continue the modern practice of investing re-
sources in research programs to gather and analyze post-merger data and to tap their
experience in investigating and prosecuting cartels.
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